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Pub. Employees’ Ret. Sys. of Nev. v. Gitter, 133 Nev. Adv. Op. 18 (Apr. 27, 2017)1 
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 
Summary  
 The Court determined that: 1) Nevada’s general slayer statutes apply to the Public 
Employees’ Retirement Act (“PERS Act”) for purposes of determining a survivor’s benefits, 2) 
the Public Retirement System (“PERS”) is not exempt from paying prejudgment and post-
judgment interest, 3) the district court had discretion to award up to $1,500 in reasonable costs 
under NRS 18.005(5) for a nontestifying expert consultant, and 4) the district court’s award of 
attorney fees under NRS 7.085 and 18.010 was inappropriate and warranted reversal.  
Background 
  In 2009, Kristine Jo Freshman, a Clark County School District and a PERS member for 
24 years, was killed by her husband, Walter Freshman. Walter pleaded guilty and was adjudicated 
of second degree murder the following year. Prior to her death, Kristine had designated her 
daughter, Shae E. Gitter, as her survivor beneficiary. In 2011, Gitter applied to obtain PERS 
survivor benefits. However, PERS denied Gitter’s application. PERS stated that it denied the claim 
based on two statutes: NRS 286.671 and 286.669. PERS explained that NRS 286.671 mandates 
that only a PERS member’s spouse or minor children are eligible to receive benefits in the case of 
a member who was married at the time of death, but NRS 286.669 makes any spouse who is 
convicted of the murder or voluntary manslaughter of a PERS member ineligible to receive 
benefits.  
  Gitter and Kristine’s estate obtained copies of Kristine’s PERS records and filed suit 
seeking to collect PERS survivor benefits. The district courted granted Gitter partial summary 
judgment and declared that NRS Chapter 41B (Nevada’s slayer statutes) apply to NRS Chapter 
286 (the PERS Act). As such, when determining survivor benefits, the court deems as predeceased 
a PERS member’s spouse who has been convicted of murdering the PERS member. Additionally, 
PERS must consider the PERS member as being unmarried at the time of death. Following the 
court’s decision, the parties stipulated to an amount of $203,321.76 for back payments owed by 
PERS. Gitter filed a subsequent motion seeking prejudgment and post-judgment interest. The 
district court granted Gitter’s motion and ordered PERS to pay interest under NRS 99.040(1)(a).  
Gitter also filed a memorandum of costs that included $5,000 in expert witness fees for a 
financial consultant. The district court determined that Nevada law was unclear regarding whether 
fees in excess of $5,000 could be recovered for nontestifying experts. Consequently, the district 
court limited costs to $1,500 for the expert witness costs under NRS 18.005(5).  
Additionally, Gitter filed a motion for attorney fees under NRS 7.085 and 18.010 for 
$96,272.50. Gitter argued that PERS and its counsel continually took unreasonable positions 
throughout the course of litigation that were not supported by Nevada law. The district court 
granted Gitter attorney fees stating PERS acted unreasonably and vexatiously.  
																																								 																				
1  By Scott Cardenas 
Discussion 
Nevada’s slayer statutes are applicable to the PERS Act 
 The PERS Act allows a survivor beneficiary to collect benefits only “if the member is 
unmarried on the date of the member’s death.”2 If the PERS member is married, then the payments 
go to the member’s spouse and any minor children.3 However, under the PERS slayer statute, a 
person cannot collect benefits if they are convicted of the murder or voluntary manslaughter of the 
PERS member.4 Similarly, Nevada’s slayer statute mandates “that a killer cannot profit from his 
or her wrong.”5 Further, under the Nevada slayer statute treats that a killer as if they predeceased 
the decedent and the killer forfeits any benefit.6 The Court gave deference to PERS in its argument 
that Gitter could not be the beneficiary since Kristen was married when she was killed and Nevada 
law barred payments to Walter.  
Standard of review 
 PERS challenged the district court’s order granting partial summary judgment on Gitter’s 
claim for declaratory relief. The Court reviews a district court’s order grating summary judgment 
de novo.7 Moreover, questions of statutory construction are questions of law reviewed de novo.8 
Gitter is entitled to PERS survivor benefits because Nevada’s slayer statutes are applicable 
to the PERS Act 
 The Court began by laying the framework for how it would interpret the two statutes at 
issue in this case. The Court applies the plain language of a statute when the statute’s language is 
plain and its meaning is clear.9 It will only turn to legislative history when the statute’s language 
is ambiguous.10 Moreover, in interpreting a statute, the Court will not render any part of a statute 
meaningless or in a way that would produce absurd results.11 Rather, the Court will interpret a 
statute or rule in harmony with other statutes or rules whenever possible.12  
 NRS Chapter 41B, the slayer statutes, apply to governing instruments, such as “[a]ny 
public or private plan or system that entitles a person to the payment or transfer of any property, 
interest or benefit, including, without limitation, a plan or system that involves . . . [p]ension 
benefits, retirement benefits or other similar benefits.”13 PERS is such a governing instrument. 
This finding does not render the PERS slayer statute meaningless because this provision applies 
																																								 																				
2  NEV. REV. STAT.  286.6767(1) (2015). 
3  See NEV. REV. STAT 286.673, 286.674-.6766 (2015). 
4  NEV. REV. STAT 286.669 (2015). 
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8  Davis v. Beling, 128 Nev. 301, 314, 278 P.3d 501, 510 (2012). 
9  Leven v. Frey, 123 Nev. 399, 403, 168 P.3d 712, 715 (2007). 
10  Las Vegas Dev. Assocs., LLC v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 130 Nev., Adv. Op. 37, 325 P.3d 1259, 1262 (2014). 
11  Leven, 123 Nev. at 405, 168 P.3d at 716. 
12  Watson Rounds, P.C. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 131 Nev., Adv. Op. 79, 358 P.3d 228, 232 (2015). 
13  NEV. REV. STAT 41B.090(9)(a) (2015). 
to prevent Walter from receiving benefits.14 However, NRS 41B.310 also applies to treat Walter 
as if he predeceased Kristine. Moreover, NRS 41B.310(3) is not directed solely at the spousal 
benefit, and does not abrogate the rights of a nonkiller. Therefore, Gitter has her own rights under 
the PERS Act to claim benefits. 
Deference to PERS 
 PERS may be given deference in interpreting the PERS Act, however, it is not entitled to 
deference in interpreting other generally applicable statutes such as NRS Chapter 41B, the slayer 
statutes.15 Accordingly, the Court refused to defer to PERS in interpreting how NRS Chapter 41B 
applies to the PERS Act.  
Interest should have been awarded under NRS 17.130 
Standard of Review 
 Whether the statutes that allow prejudgment and post-judgment interest apply is a question 
of law that the Court reviews de novo.16 
PERS is not exempted from paying interest 
 Prejudgment and post-judgment interest may be awarded when a statute allows. Here, both 
are allowed under NRS 99.040 and 17.130 and PERS failed to point to a statute that prohibited the 
district court from awarding interest under the circumstances in this case. The PERS Act need not 
expressly provide for the payment of prejudgment or post-judgment interest.  
PERS must pay interest pursuant to NRS 17.130 
 A party can obtain interest, pursuant to NRS 99.040(1)(a), for cases where an express or 
implied contract exists. On the other hand, NRS 17.130(2) provides for interest on any judgment 
when there is no interest rate provided by contract or otherwise by law, or specified by the 
judgment. Here, the district court erred in concluding that Gitter’s survivor benefits constituted 
money due in a contract case because PERS’s obligation to pay survivor benefits is statutory, not 
contractual. Moreover, the designation form identifying beneficiaries is not a contract. 
Accordingly, the Court reversed the district court’s award of interest under NRS 99.040(1)(a) and 
remanded with instructions for the district court to award interest to Gitter under NRS 17.130.  
Gitter is entitled to $1,500 in costs for expert fees under NRS 18.005(5) 
 Standard of Review 
 The Court reviews awards of costs for an abuse of discretion.17 
																																								 																				
14  NEV. REV. STAT 286.669 (2015). 
15		See, e.g., Meridian Gold Co. v. State ex rel. Dep't of Taxation, 119 Nev. 630, 635, 81 P.3d 516, 519 (2003) 
16  See Kerala Props., Inc. v. Familian, 122 Nev. 601, 604 (2006). 
17  Logan v. Abe, 350 P.3d 1139, 1144 (2015). 
The district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding costs to Gitter for expert fees 
under NRS 18.005(5) 
Under NRS 18.020(3), a prevailing party may recover costs against any adverse party 
against whom a judgment is rendered in an action for money and damages where the plaintiff seeks 
recovery of more than $2,500. Further, under NRS 18.005(5), costs include reasonable fees for up 
to five expert witness but cannot exceed $1,500 for each witness unless the court concludes that 
the witness’s testimony necessitated a larger fee. Nevada law requires an expert to testify in order 
to recover more than $1,500 in expert fees. However, NRS 18.005 does not require that the expert 
testify to collect fees less than $1,500. Moreover, the district court in this case found the fees to be 
reasonable. Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it awarded $1,500 for 
Gitter’s expert consultant under NRS 18.005(5).  
The Court then went on to clarify the law regarding expert witness fees under NRS 
18.005(5). Under NRS 18.005(5), an expert witness who does not testify can only recover costs 
equal to or less than $1,500. Further, in cases where an expert acts only as a consultant and does 
not testify, the district court may award $1,500 or less, but only if it finds such costs constitute 
“reasonable fees” under NRS 18.005(5).  
No attorney fees are warranted under NRS 7.085 or 18.010 
 Counsel for PERS petitioned the Court for a writ of mandamus directing the district court 
to vacate its order awarding attorney fees after it found PERS’s counsel jointly and severally liable 
for attorney fees under NRS 7.085. A writ of mandamus is available in order to compel an act the 
law requires or to control an unwarranted exercise of discretion. Moreover, it is available when 
there is no other adequate remedy at law.18 Petitioners had no other way to challenge the district 
court’s order making them liable for over $95,000 in attorney fees, and the Court exercised its 
discretion to consider the petition. Ultimately, the Court found that the district court abused its 
discretion in awarding attorney fees.  
 Standard of review 
 The Court reviews a district court’s order awarding attorney fees for an abuse of discretion. 
The district court abused its discretion by awarding attorney fees under NRS 7.085 and 
18.010 
 NRS 18.101 allows a district court to order an award of attorney fees to a prevailing party 
if the district court finds that an opposing party’s claim or defense was brought or maintained with 
no reasonable grounds or to harass. Moreover, under NRS 7.085(1) a district court can hold an 
attorney personally liable for attorney fees and costs when the attorney unreasonably and 
vexatiously causes a civil action or proceeding to extend. A district court abuses its discretion 
when it orders an award of attorney fees without including sufficient reasoning and findings to 
support such a conclusion. Here, the district court’s order does not demonstrate that PERS 
maintained a defense that was not well-grounded in fact or law, that petitioners acted unreasonably 
																																								 																				
18  NEV. REV. STAT 34.170 (2015). 
or vexatiously, or that the defense was without reasonable grounds. To the contrary, PERS’s 
defenses were based on novel and arguable issues of law. Therefore, the district court abused its 
discretion. Accordingly, the Court granted the petition and reversed the attorney fees award under 
NRS 7.085(1) and 18.010(2)(b).  
Conclusion  
 NRS Chapter 41B applies to the PERS Act. Therefore, Gitter is entitled to survivor benefits 
and the district court’s judgment was affirmed. Moreover, Gitter is entitled to prejudgment and 
post-judgment interest under NRS 17.130, however, the portion of the district court’s order 
awarding interest under NRS 99.040(1)(a) was vacated, and remanded with instructions to award 
interest under NRS 17.130 because the case was a statutory, non-contractual matter. Further, the 
district court’s order of costs under NRS 18.005(5) was affirmed because Nevada allows up to 
$1,500 in costs for nontestifying expert consultants. Finally, the district court’s award of attorney 
fees was unwarranted under NRS 7.085(1) and 18.010(2)(b). Accordingly, the order awarding 
attorney fees against PERS was reversed, and the petition to issue a writ of mandamus instructing 
the district court to vacate its order was granted.   
 
 
 
